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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The majority stressed the fact that the words "judgment or
decree" had been retained through the various changes in the
codes of procedure in spite of the fact that the category of special
proceedings with its resultant final orders had been created. Un-
der these circumstances they felt that what the Legislature had
not seen fit to add should not be supplied by the courts. The
dissenters maintained that the inclusion of final orders in C.P.A.
§ 44 could fairly be implied in view of the fact that the Legisla-
ture had apparently intended to create a comprehensive system
of limitations.11
A fine for contempt is unquestionably different from the
ordinary civil judgment. It is not, for example, a debt which
will be released by a discharge in bankruptcy. 2 A fine awarded
to the state for contempt of the Legislature would seem more
closely akin to a fine in a criminal action. It appears that there
is no limitation on the recovery of such flues.13
Service on Corporations
When the Legislature has provided an exclusive method to
be used for service on a party, failure to follow the prescribed
method obviates the attempt to obtain jurisdiction over the
party.1 4 In Sease v. Central Greyhound Lines of New York,1"
the Court of Appeals applied this rule most stringently.
The plaintiff, in order to ascertain the name and address of
the operator of a bus which is alleged to have caused the plain-
tiff damage in a highway accident, inquired: (1) at the office of
the sheriff where the accident report was filed; (2) at the local
office of the defendant nearest the scene of the accident; (3) of
the New York Bureau of Motor Vehicles via a State Police tele-
type to the offices of the Bureau in Albany where the defendant's
application for a motor vehicle license was filed. The report
from all of these sources was that the operator of the bus was
Central Greyhound Lines of New York with offices at 2600 Hamil-
ton Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio. Proceeding on the theory that the
defendant was a foreign corporation, and, therefore, a non-resi-
dent operator of a motor vehicle in this state, the plaintiff at-
tempted service under Section 52 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.
The defendant was, in fact, a New York corporation with offices
11. See C. P. A. § 10.
12. In re Koronsky, 170 Fed. 719 (2d Cir. 1907).
13. See Smith v. United States, 143 F. 2d 228, 229 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 323 U. S.
729 (1944).
14. Eisenhofer v. New York Zeiting Publishing & Printing Co., 91 App. Div.
94, 86 N. Y. Supp. 438 (1st Dep't 1904).
15. 306 N. Y. 284, 117 N. E. 2d 899 (1954).
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in Syracuse. The Cleveland address was that of the principal
office of the defendant, however, and was given as the defendant's
address on the application filed with the Bureau of Motor
Vehicles for this reason. The state of incorporation was also
included on the application, but this information was not trans-
mitted to the plaintiff. The court, by a 4-3 vote, reversed the
finding of the trial court, which was affirmed by the Appellate
Division, that, under the circumstances, service under Section 52
was not improper.
The majority found that the defendant was in no way to
blame for the plaintiff's mistaken belief since the defendant's
statements to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles were correct and
the state of incorporation was included in the application. It
was no fault of the defendant, they maintained, that the latter
information was not communicated to the plaintiff.
Judge Dye, in his dissenting opinion, asserted that the de-
fendant was, for purposes of service of process, a resident of
Ohio. Such a concept of a non-resident domiciliary has. long
standing recognition in the courts." The dissent also suggests
that the service may have been proper on a theory of estoppel
analogous to the finding of misrepresentation in cases involving
the use of license plates registered in the name of another.'7
The only difference between the manner of service used in
this case and that which would have been unquestionably allow-
able ,seems to be that the plaintiff mailed the summons to the
Secretary of State, whereas personal service on that officer is
the method required.'8 The desirability of maintaining strict
compliance with the prescribed methods of service was, however,
apparently deemed to outweigh any equitable considerations in
favor of the plaintiff.
Joinder of Parties
When a stockholder brings a derivative action he sues, not in
his own right, but in the right of the corporation.19 Generally
the stockholder must join the corporation in such a suit.20 It
has been held, however, that when a derivative action involves
16, Haggart v. Moran, 5 N. Y. 422 (1851); Uslan v. Woronoff, 173 Misc. 693,
18 N. Y. S. 2d 222 (City Ct. of New Rochelle), af'd 259 App. Div. 1093, 21 N. Y. S. 2d
613 (2d De't 1940).
17. See infra p. 53.
18. Compare VEHICLE AND T .vFic LAw § 52 with C. P. A. § 228, STOCK COR-
PoRATroN LAW § 25.
19. Clarke v. Greenberg, 296 N. Y. 146, 71 N. E. 2d 443 (1947).
20. Greaves v. Gouge, 64 N. Y. 154 (1877) ; 13 FLETcHER, CO ORPATIONS § 5997
(Rev. ed. 1943).
